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Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) is an acute
respiratory illness caused by a newly described
coronavirus (1-3). The epidemic started in early
November 2002 in Guandong province, China; however it
remained unreported until mid-February 2003 (4).
During this period, the disease rapidly spread to other
countries. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
of China and Vietnam were the other 2 countries
reporting cases by mid-March, before Singapore and
Canada joined the list (5-8). The disease presents a nonspecific respiratory illness characterized by high fever,
chills, headache and muscle ache. Radiological findings are
compatible with atypical pneumonia. The disease, may
then progress to acute respiratory distress syndrome
(ARDS), which is the main cause of mortality among
patients (5,7). The causative virus is predominantly
spread by droplets or by direct and indirect contact (9).
Viral shedding in feces and urine has also been described.
Health care workers in hospitals are among those
commonly infected (5). The following review intends to
provide a comprehensive background on the several
aspects of this newly described disease.
Epidemiology and timeline of the pandemic
SARS established its special place in the history of
infectious diseases for which an etiological agent was
detected in record time while the genetic sequencing of
the virus was materialized shortly thereafter. The
characteristics of epidemics in the most –hard-hit
countries and elsewhere were described by collaborative
team work provided by scientists in different countries. It
was this cooperation that helped halt the epidemic. This

collaborative work also resulted in the release a batch of
diagnostic tests; however, no commercial tests had hit the
market at the time of writing. Similarly, no spesific
treatment modality has been made available so far, hence
patients receive supportive therapy and/or are treated
with antivirals with no proven activity against the
etiological agent.
Although the initial cases of SARS were traced back to
mid-November 2002, the first report about the disease
was released by the World Health Organization (WHO) on
14 February, 2003, indicating that 305 cases and 5
deaths from an influenza-like illness had occurred
between 16 November 2002 and 9 February 2003 in
Guangdong province, China. (4). At the end of February,
Hong Kong and Vietnam reported outbreaks of a severe
form of pneumonia. Among those who succumbed to the
disease was Dr. Carlo Urbani, a WHO epidemiologist who
reported the first data of the epidemic in Vietnam on 28
February. WHO called the new syndrome as “severe acute
respiratory syndrome”, i.e. SARS, on 10 March (10).
A global alert was issued on 12 March by WHO about
the mysterious pneumonia, which included a travel alert
for the affected areas. By then, cases had also identified
in Singapore and Canada (7,8).
At the end of March, the number of suspected and/or
probable cases (see below for case definitions) exceeded
1300, 49 of whom died, and the disease had spread to 8
countries. The local transmission of SARS was confirmed
in Canada, Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and Vietnam.
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) of
the United States reported a cluster of 12 patients with
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the disease in Hong Kong whose infection could be traced
back to a doctor from southern China who arrived on 21
February 2003 and stayed in a local hotel. A continued
steep rise in the number of SARS cases was detected in a
large housing estate (Amoy Gardens) consisting of ten
35-storey blocks, which are home to around 15,000
persons. A detailed epidemiological investigation found
that a single patient with diarrhea who transmitted the
disease to 321 residents was the source of the outbreak.
A detective–like epidemiological investigation revealed
that the rapid spread of SARS in this case involved
defective U-traps in bathrooms, an amplifying effect of
bathroom exhaust fans, a cracked sewer vent pipe, and an
aerodynamic effect in a lightwell which bathroom
windows opened onto (11). The residents were isolated
for 10 days in their flats and were subsequently moved to
rural isolation camps for 10 days.
As of 1 July, the number of probable cases reported
by WHO was 8445 from 33 different countries or
regions of the world (12). The highest figures came from
China from where a total of 5327 cases with 348 deaths
were reported. Hong Kong was the second with 1755
cases and 298 deaths, and Taiwan reported 678 probable
cases and 84 deaths. Singapore, one of the hardest-hit
countries in the early stages of the epidemic, recorded
206 cases and 32 deaths. On 28 April, Vietnam became
the first country to stop local transmission of SARS.
Thereafter, strict screening and preventive measures
imposed by WHO and local health authorities in affected
countries led to the infection being controlled from the
second half of May. Currently WHO does not advise the
imposition of restrictions for travellers to any area of the
world, passengers screening from Toronto and Taiwan is
recommended (13).
Case definitions
The WHO case definitions for surveillance purposes
were revised on 1 May 2003 and are summarized below
(14). The final version of these definitions includes
laboratory test results that will be explained further in the
text. Since none of the diagnostic tests have been proved
to be accurate, SARS remains a diagnosis of exclusion.
Suspect case
1) A person presenting after 1 November 2002 with a
history of:
high fever (>38 °C) and cough or breathing difficulty
and one or more of the following exposures during
the 10 days prior to onset of symptoms:
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close contact with a person who is a suspected or
probable case of SARS
history of travel to an area with recent local
transmission of SARS, or
residing in an area with recent local transmission of
SARS
2) A person with an unexplained acute respiratory illness
resulting in death after 1 November 2002, but on
whom no autopsy has been performed, and one or
more of the following exposures during the 10 days
prior to onset of symptoms:
close contact with a person who is a suspected or
probable case of SARS,
history of travel to an area with recent local
transmission of SARS, or
residing in an area with recent local transmission of
SARS.
Close contact defines a person who cared for, lived with,
or had direct contact with
respiratory secretions or body fluids of a suspected or
probable case of SARS.
Probable case
1) A suspected case with radiographic evidence of
infiltrates consistent with pneumonia or respiratory
distress syndrome (RDS) on chest X-ray.
2) A suspected case of SARS that is positive for SARS
coronavirus by one or more assays.
3) A suspected case with autopsy findings consistent with
the pathology of RDS without an identifiable cause.
A case should be excluded if an alternative diagnosis
can fully explain the illness.
The
etiological
agent
coronovirus “SARSCoV”)

(SARS-associated

A network of 11 laboratories in 9 countries was
established by WHO on March 17 for multicenter
research on the etiology of SARS and to simultaneously
develop a diagnostic test. Within 2 weeks a novel
coronavirus was isolated by laboratories in Hong Kong,
Germany and the United States (1-3). The new virus was
designated SARS-associated coronavirus (SARSCoV). It
had never been seen in humans or animals, and had only
a moderate relationship with other previously known
human coronaviruses. Shortly thereafter, complete

M.AKOVA

genome sequences of the new coronavirus (15-16) were
published by a Canadian laboratory and the CDC. The
sequence analysis provided further evidence that
SARSCoV is an animal virus that has been able to cross
the species barrier (10). Actually, there has been some
speculation from Hong Kong indicating that SARSCoV
may have jumped to humans from wild animals like civet
cats, which are considered a delicacy in southern China
(17).
The coronaviruses are members of a family of large,
enveloped, positive-stranded RNA viruses and are
associated with a variety of diseases including mild
gastroenteritis and mild respiratory tract infections in
humans and domestic animals. SARSCoV is the first
coronavirus to cause severe disease in humans
(15,16,18).
While the known human coronaviruses are able to
survive on environmental surfaces for up to 3 h, the
initial evidence indicates that SARSCoV survives in feces
and urine at room temperature for at least 1-2 days. The
stability is up to 4 days in stools from patients with
diarrhea (the pH of which is higher than that of a normal
stool). The virus can survive in cell cultures after 21 days
at 4 °C and 80 °C. After 48 h at room temperature, on
several surfaces including plastic ones, the concentration
of the virus is reduced by one log only, indicating that the
virus is more stable than other known human
coronaviruses under these conditions. Heating to 56 °C
and exposure to different commonly used disinfectants
and fixatives including household bleach and 75% alcohol
inactivate SARS-CoV within 5 minutes (19).
Symtoms and clinical findings:
SARS is usually presented with nonspecific clinical
findings resembling those of atypical pneumonia. The
incubation period varies between 2-10 days after which
patients develop fever (>38.0 °C), chills, rigors,
headache, dizziness, malaise and myalgia. Although
sputum production, sore throat, coryza, nausea and
vomiting, and diarrhea are reported to be less common
(6,8), in some clusters of patients the incidence of these
symptoms differed considerably. For instance, the
incidence of diarrhea in patients from Amoy Gardens in
Hong Kong was around 50%, whereas it was only 2-4%
in others (11). Physical examination was unrevealing,
excluding high body temperature that was observed in

most patients, while inspiratory crackles could be heard
at the base of the lungs in some (10).
The severity of the illness ranges from mild to
moderate symptoms to a severe disease process with
respiratory failure due to ARDS and death. Clinical
deterioration requiring intensive care and ventilatory
support generally occurs 7 to 10 days after the onset of
symptoms (3,6). The case fatality ratio of SARS ranges
from 0% to 50% depending on the age group affected:
less than 1% in persons aged 24 years or younger; 6%
in persons aged 25 to 44 years; 15% in persons aged 45
to 64 years; and greater than 50% in persons aged 65
years and older (10).
SARS has been reported to cause a milder clinical
course in younger children in comparison to that seen in
adults and teenagers (20). Only a minority of the patient
population (3%) in Hong Kong was made up of children
less than 15 years of age, and they accounted for only 3
% of all cases. So far, no explanation has been provided
for this. The symptoms in teenage patients were similar
to those seen in adults, whereas the younger children
(<12 years) presented mainly with a cough and runny
nose, and none had chills, rigor or myalgia. In addition,
the radiological changes were milder and generally
resolved more quickly than in the teenagers.
Laboratory and radiological findings
The most common laboratory abnormalities include
lymphopenia, leukopenia, thrombocytopenia, elevated
lactate dehydrogenase levels, elevated aspartate
aminotransferase levels and elevated creatine kinase
levels of non-cardiac origin (6,7,10,21).
Chest X-ray may be normal during incubation period
and throughout the course of the illness. However, airspace consolidation represented by unilateral patchy
infiltrates which progress to bilateral multilobar
infiltration are commonly seen in most patients. In
clinically deteriorating patients these infiltrates become
enlarged. CT scan findings are compatible with those of
plain radiographs and include areas of subpleural focal
consolidation with air bronchograms and groundglass
opacities.
Radiographically,
SARS
may
be
indistinguishable from other severe forms of pneumonia
(10).
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Laboratory tools for diagnosis
Although several tests have been developed for the
diagnosis of SARS, the results of field testing to
determine their actual sensitivity and specificity are not
available yet. Therefore, the diagnosis of SARS is
currently based on clinical and epidemiological findings.
Three different types of laboratory tests have been
developed (10):
1) Antibody detection
ELISA (Enzyme Linked ImmunoSorbant Assay)
detects a mixture of IgM and IgG antibodies in the serum
of SARS patients and reliably yields positive results at
around day 21 after the onset of illness.
Immunofluorescence assay (IFA) gives earlier
positive results around 10 days after the start of
symptoms. It requires SARSCoV-infected cells fixed on a
microscope slide; patient antibodies bind to viral antigens
and are in turn detected by immunofluorescence-labeled
secondary antibodies against human IgG or IgM or both,
using an immunofluorescence microscope.
2) Molecular tests
The SARSCoV-specific RNA can be detected in various
clinical specimens such as blood, stools, respiratory
secretions or body tissues by polymerase chain reaction
(PCR). Primers have been made publicly available by
WHO network laboratories (22). Existing PCR tests are
very specific but lack sensitivity. That means that negative
tests can not rule out the presence of the SARS virus in
patients.
3) Cell culture
Specimens containing the virus, such as from
respiratory secretions, blood and stools from SARS
patients can also be detected by infecting cell cultures and
growing the virus. Once isolated, the virus must be
identified as the SARS virus with further tests. Cell
culture is a very demanding test, but it is the only means
to show the existence of a live virus. Negative cell culture
results do not exclude SARS.
Pathological findings
Post mortem histopathological evaluations of lung
tissue from patients who died from SARS showed diffuse
alveolar damage at various levels of progression and
severity, consistent with the pathologic manifestations of
ARDS (5,7,11). Among the findings revealed from 6
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autopsy cases were bronchial epithelial denudation, loss
of cilia and squamous metaplasia. Secondary bacterial
pneumonia was present in 1 case. A giant-cell infiltrate
was seen in 4 patients, with a pronounced increase in
macrophages in the alveoli and the interstitium of the
lung. Hemophagocytosis was present in 2 patients. (23)
Routes of transmission
Epidemiological data suggest that the virus is
predominantly spread by droplets or by direct and
indirect contact (9,24-26). Most of the cases occurred
following close contact with patients, including household
members and health-care workers, by those who were
not protected by contact or respiratory precautions. The
infectious virus is present at very high concentrations in
the respiratory tract of patients (2). Low amounts of viral
RNA have also been detected in the stools of patients late
in their convalescence period, making feces a potential
route of transmission (2). The airborne spread of SARS
does not seem to be a major transmission route.
However, the apparent ease of transmission in some
instances, such as in Amoy Gardens (see above), is of
concern.
Prevention
As mentioned earlier, strict infection control measures
have been of utmost importance in order to control the
epidemic. Health-care workers, household members of
the patients and other people in close contact have been
at high risk of contracting the disease. Therefore, detailed
preventive measures were described for each of those
categories (24). Droplet infection with SARS is the
primary route of spread for the virus (9) in the healthcare
setting. Surgical and N95 masks provided the best
protection for exposed healthcare workers, whereas
paper masks did not significantly reduce the risk of
infection (9). Since SARSCoV is viable in enviromental
surfaces for several days, rigorous disinfection and
hygiene procedures are essential for effective protection.
CDC recommended careful hand hygiene for all
contact with suspected SARS patients including hand
washing with soap and water. If hands are not visibly
soiled, alcohol-based handrubs may be used as an
alternative to hand washing. For admitted patients,
healthcare personnel should exercise contact precautions
(e.g., use of gown and gloves for contact with the patient
or their environment), and they should wear eye
protection for all patient contact. Airborne precautions
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should be implemented (e.g., an isolation room with
negative pressure relative to the surrounding area and
use of an N-95 filtering disposable respirator for persons
entering the room). If these precautions cannot be fully
implemented, patients should be placed in a private room,
and all persons entering the room should wear N-95
respirators (10).
If SARS is suspected in a patient in an outpatient
setting a surgical mask should be placed over the patient’s
nose and mouth. If masking the patient is not feasible,
the patient should be asked to cover his/her mouth with
a disposable tissue when coughing, talking or sneezing.
The patient should immediately be separated from others
and isolated in a private room if possible. Those patients
who reside at home should wear a surgical mask. If the
patient is unable to wear a surgical mask, household
members should wear surgical masks when in close
contact with the patient (10).
Treatment
No effective treatment regimen has been described
(27). For patients with progressive deterioration,
intensive and supportive care is of primary importance.
During the peak of the epidemic the patients were treated
most frequently with ribavirin and steroids, although the
efficacy of these drugs has not been proven in the
absence of clinical indicators. Ribavirin is recommended
to be given 8 mg/kg every 8 h intravenously or 1.2 g
every 12 h orally, with an oral loading dose of 4 g for
those with normal renal function tests. Recommended
duration of therapy is for 7-14 days. Hydrocortisone 2
mg/kg is given every 6 h or 4 mg/kg every 8 h
intravenously. Dose reduction and stopping the drug

course over 1 week is recommended when there is clear
clinical improvement. For severe and rapidly deteriorating
cases methylprednisolone 10 mg/kg every 24 h
intravenously for 2 days is given, and then the therapy is
continued with hydrocortisone as above (5,8,10,28,29).
Usually patients received antibacterial agents such as
macrolides or respiratory quinolones (e.g. levofloxacin)
for typical and atypical microorganisms for 7-14 days.
Voluntary home isolation is recommended for those in
contact with probable SARS cases and each contact should
be visited or telephoned daily by a member of a public
health care team. If the contact develops disease
symptoms, the contact should be investigated locally at an
appropriate health care facility. The most consistent first
symptom that is likely to appear is fever.
Future aspects of the disease
WHO reported on 18 June that SARS was being
brought under control (27), but warned that many
unanswered questions still existed including the
reservoir(s) of the virus, possible seasonal recurrence and
the contribution of environmental contamination to
transmission. Therefore, the need for at least a full year
of surveillance is proposed to determine whether the
disease has established endemicity and to ensure that no
cases have spread, but remained undetected, to countries
with poor surveillance and reporting systems (30). WHO
also warned that a high level of vigilance should be
maintained for new cases, since the possibility exists that
SARSCoV hides somewhere in nature, waiting to find the
suitable conditions for the efficient spread of its infection
to human hosts.
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